The Carthaginian land army
Carthage was primarily a trading nation seeking to extend its commercial connections, its sphere of influence and its empire. A maritime nation supported by military force, Carthage was able to maintain her role and trading monopolies for three centuries, mainly through a superior navy which was not averse to sinking rival trade vessels. Such incidents were not regarded as acts of war, especially since many such losses were probably attributed to natural disasters, given the absence of any survivors to testify to the contrary.
The Carthaginian army consisted mainly of mercenaries recruited from the various subject territories who, except in Spain, seldom served in their own countries, and remained isolated from one another through differences of language and religion. They were then largely dependent upon theCarthaginian fleet for supplies, and discipline was enforced via a strict code which included capital punishment. Each territory provided special military skills:Numidia supplied a nimble, courageous and indefatigable cavalry armed with spears and javelins. These lightly clad horsemen, who rode without saddle or bridle, had superb fighting skills, both in the hills or on the plains, manoeuvring like flocks of starlings that wheel and change direction as though by instinct. Threatening and enticing, surprising with sudden and unexpected moves, there was no cavalry on the
battlefield to match them.
From the Balearic Islands came the formidable slingers, organised into corps of 2,000 men who were armed with two types of slings, one for long-range engagements against a densely packed enemy and the other for close-quarter, individual targets up to some 600 feet. Their delivery of stones or lead, which could penetrate a helmet or light protective armour, matched the rate of fire and accuracy of contemporary archers. They were savage fighters who were often paid in women rather than gold or silver.
Though infantry soldiers were recruited from Spanish hill tribes, they were in perpetual conflict with one another, a national disharmony which had simplified the Carthaginian conquest of Spain. They were experts at guerrilla warfare but of temperamental disposition and doubtful loyalty, not best suited to set-piece battles. Their basic weapon was a short sword suitable for cutting and thrusting. Also recruited from Spain were lightly armed cavalry whose horses could carry a second rider, ready to dismount and fight as an infantryman.
The largest mercenary contingent, however, were the Libyans of Tunisia. Hardened by the harsh conditions of their own country, they were versatile fighters who served both as light infantry skirmishers and in the heavily concentrated infantry of the line. There were Gauls too but relatively few until Hannibal's invasion of Italy encouraged them to join in substantial numbers to fight their traditional enemies, the Romans. They fought without armour and showed great dash in the attack, but they were unreliable, especially when hard-pressed. Then there were the elephants. Initially the Carthaginians only used the African elephant found in the forests around Carthage, at the foot of the Atlas mountains and along the coast of Morocco, but later it seems probable that Hannibal obtained some of the larger Indian elephants from Egypt. Until tactics had been developed to counter them on the battlefield, elephants struck terror into men and horses alike and their small numbers were disproportionately effective. When frightened, however, they sometimes wreaked devastation in their own ranks by turning and fleeing.
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Navy
The navy played a vital part in the Carthaginian war machine and, unlike the army, it was manned entirely by-Carthaginians. There were three basic types of ships: large cargo vessels which were easily converted to troop transports; warships; and small, general-purpose vessels. The cargo vessels, or transports, had rounded hulls to provide capacious holds and were about four times as long as their width. The warships, needing speed rather than capacity, were long and narrow in order to accommodate the greatest possible number of oarsmen. Unlike the earlier Phoenician and Greek triremes which had three levels of oars, each with a single rower, from the 4th century the Carthaginian trireme, and then the quinquereme - the classic warship of the Punic Wars - had four and five rowers respectively, sitting on the same bench and plying the same oar. Thus the sides of the ships were lower than the Greek triremes, which enhanced stability.
Both the trireme and the quinquereme were about 40 metres long and 6 metres wide,
with a draught of no more than 2 metres. With 30 oars on each side, they had crews of
around 240 and 300 respectively, together with some 30 to 40 sailors who handled the
sails and worked on deck. The ships had two sets of sails: the central main mast provided
propulsion and the smaller mast, mounted on the prow, allowed the ship to be manoeuvred in cross winds. Only sails were used on the approach to a battle area, but once the enemy was sighted, the masts were lowered and the rowers took over. The basic tactical unit consisted of 12 ships, which could be grouped together to form a fleet of varying size - 120 ships, or 10 tactical units, was the normal number. The general-purpose vessels were smaller, swift and easily manoeuvrable, and were mainly employed on reconnaissance and communication tasks. Two such vessels have been found off the western coast of Sicily and show how the Phoenicians constructed their ships. The wooden components were prefabricated and assembled later. This discovery helps explain how the Romans were able to dismantle and copy a Carthaginian ship
once they had captured one. Battles usually took place near the shore, where the ships
could be handled in relatively calm water.
There were two basic battle tactics. In both instances the fleet was initially deployed in line ahead, but the subsequent action depended on the enemy's dispositions. If there
was sufficient space, the Carthaginian ships would move alongside the enemy and by
suddenly turning, ram them amidships. If there was not enough room for this manoeuvre then the Carthaginian vessels would break through gaps in the enemy line and turn
about sharply to take them in the rear. The Carthaginians, then, had a potent navy
which assured them of sea supremacy at the outbreak of hostilities. With the versatile use of cargo ships as troop transports, they possessed a strategic mobility that offered a
unique advantage over any opponent, so long as they had commanders capable of
exploiting this superiority.
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