[/COLOR]Bây giờ nói đơn giản là vầy: giả thuyết Đức thua toàn cục vì thiếu xăng, ko phải là kiến thức phổ thông hay phổ biến, vì vậy tôi ko coi nó là thông tin chính xác đc.
Nếu nó có, thì yêu cầu chứng minh. Và tôi sẽ bác bỏ bằng ý của mình.
Còn nếu không thì không thể yêu cầu tôi bác bỏ nó, vì mọi thứ trên đời đều phi vấn đề này.
Tớ tìm được 3 nguồn tin mà tớ chắc rằng nó là là những nguồn tin chính thống và rất chắc chắn.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Campaign_of_World_War_II
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/jul-aug/becker.htm
http://www.oil150.com/essays/2007/08/oil-strategy-in-world-war-ii
Mà theo đó có thể thấy được các vấn đề sau.
- Trước cuộc chiến - cũng là cái nhìn chung Đức ko tự túc được lượng dầu cần mà phụ thuộc nhiều vào nhập khẩu.
"In 1938, of the total consumption of 44 million barrels, imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels or
roughly 60 percent of the total supply. An additional 3.8 million barrels were imported overland from European sources (2.8 million barrels came from Romania alone), and another 3.8 million barrels were derived from domestic oil production. The remainder of the total, 9 million barrels, were produced synthetically. Although the total overseas imports were even higher in 1939 before the onset of the blockade in September (33 million barrels),
this high proportion of overseas imports only indicated how precarious the fuel situation would become should Germany be cut off from them"
- Đầu cuộc chiến cho dù chiếm được lãnh thổ, chiến lợi phẩm thì vẫn ko bù đắp được lượng dầu cần cho quân và kinh tế ( dự báo cạn kiệt vào tháng 8 /41 ). Điều đấy ảnh hưởng đến chiến lược của Đức.
'At the outbreak of the war, Germany’s stockpiles of fuel consisted of a total of 15 million barrels. The campaigns in Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France added another 5 million barrels in booty, and imports from the Soviet Union accounted for 4 million barrels in 1940 and 1.6 million barrels in the first half of 1941.
Yet a High Command study in May of 1941 noted that with monthly military requirements for 7.25 million barrels and imports and home production of only 5.35 million barrels, German stocks would be exhausted by August 1941. The 26 percent shortfall could only be made up with petroleum from Russia. The need to provide the lacking 1.9 million barrels per month and the urgency to gain possession of the Russian oil fields in the Caucasus mountains, together with Ukrainian grain and Donets coal,
were thus prime elements in the German decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941"
- Vốn dĩ đã ko đủ cung, lại bị đánh phá khiến cho lượng dầu Đức có ( chủ yếu từ Romania ) mỗi lúc một sụt giảm.
" Although the exports were almost half of Romania’s total production, they were considerably less than the Germans expected. One reason for the shortfall was that the Romanian fields were being depleted. There were other reasons as well why the Romanians failed to increase their shipments. Foremost among these was Germany’s inability to make all of its promised deliveries of coal and other products to Romania. Furthermore, although Romania was allied with Germany, the Romanians wished to husband their country’s most valuable resources.8 Finally, the air raids on the Ploesti oil fields and refineries in August 1943 destroyed 50 percent of the Romanian refinery capacity. Aerial mining of the Danube River constituted an additional serious transportation impediment. Even so, Romanian deliveries amounted to 7 million barrels in the first half of 1944 and were not halted until additional raids on Ploesti had been flown in the late spring and summer of 1944. "
"The reliance of Germany on oil and oil products for its war machine was identified before the war and the strategic bombing started with RAF attacks on Germany in 1940. After the US entered the war, it carried out daytime "precision" attacks such as Operation Tidal Wave against refineries in Romania in 1943. The "last major strategic raid" of the war was on a refinery in Norway in April 1945."
"
The British had identified the importance of Germany's fuel supplies before the war in their "Western Air Plan 5(c)".[8] The focus of British bombing during 1940 changed repeatedly in response to directives from the Air Ministry. At the start of June, oil targets were made a priority of night bombing with attacks on other war industry to be made on dark nights (when the oil targets could not be located) but with the proviso that "indiscriminate action" should be avoided. On 20 June oil targets were made third priority below the German aircraft industry and lines of communication between Germany and the armies at the front. Following a brief period when German shipping was given priority, oil targets were made secondary priority in mid July under a policy of concentrated attack with five oil refineries listed for attention.[9] Sir Charles Portal was sceptical of the likelihood of success of the policy identifying that only a few targets could be located by average crews under moonlit conditions."
- Nhìn chung một phần thất bại của Đức từ việc thiếu dầu.
"It ended for Germany in the dust and ashes of defeat in the spring of 1945 with her war machine slowing to dead center,
in part for lack of oil. Germany’s oil position during the war-built in large part upon synthetic fuel-was always precarious. The Oil Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey notes that “throughout the war her oil stocks, particularly critical items like aviation and motor gasolines, were so tight her whole military effort in the air and on the ground would have collapsed like a pricked balloon in three or four months had her oil supply dried up.” "
- Ko những Đức mà nhìn chung là cả khối phát xít đều thiếu dầu
Dẫn chứng Ý thiếu dầu.
"Shortage of oil was also a key factor in limiting the operations of the Italian Navy throughout the war. The Italian war reserve of fuel-far too low a figure-was exhausted by late summer, 1941. The Navy’s needs were at least 200,000 tons a month for full freedom of operations:
rationing reduced the men-of-war to less than 90,000 tons a month in 1941, and the situation worsened steadily.
By the end of April, 1942, Italian fleet units were reduced to the fuel supply actually on board. As a matter of fact, they never took part in another war mission after mid-June."
- Một vài dẫn chứng về việc thiếu dầu đã ảnh hưởng như thế nào đến các trận đánh.
"The defeat of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s famous Afrika Korps at El Alamein was prefaced, and made possible, by the systematic reduction-by air attack-of German-Italian oil stores and other supplies and by the strangulation of air blockade."
"In Europe, the influence of oil upon the development of the campaign-from Normandy to the Elbe-is familiar to all students of World War II. Generally George Pattons’s famous Third Army bogged down in the mud of Lorraine at a crucial time in the late summer of 1944, in part because gasoline supplied had not been able to keep up with his fast-moving tanks. The famous “Red Ball” express-a special supply truck line- had not been able to keep the fuel flowing rapidly enough to our advancing armies from the Normandy beachheads."
"As was the case in all areas of Russian production, the retreating forces had done a thorough job of destroying or dismantling the usable installations; consequently, the Germans had to start from scratch. In view of past experience with this type of Russian policy, such destruction was expected, and Field Marshal Hermann Göring’s staff had begun making the necessary preparations in advance. But a shortage of transport that was competing with military requirements, a shortage of drill equipment as well as drillers, and the absence of refining capacity at Maikop created such difficulties that when the German forces were compelled to withdraw from Maikop in January 1943 in order to avoid being cut off after the fall of Stalingrad,
Germany had failed to obtain a single drop of Caucasian oil. "
...
dẫn chứng lung tung trong đấy, tớ chỉ trích ra được vài đoạn.
